Pynchoni stiilinäide

Tõlgin Vihiku uude numbrisse paar juppi Pynchonit. Niipalju kui ma tean, ei ole seda hardcore postmodernse kirjutamise üht absoluutset tippu eesti keeles seni veel ridagi, nii et järgmisest Vihikust saab temast nüüd eesti keeleski väikese meki suhu.

Asi edeneb päris visalt. Tõlkisin hiljaaegu ühe poliitilise filosoofi doktoritööd, see edenes 5-6 lk päevas. Pynchoni tempo on nii 2 lk päevas, mille järel on pea töö jätkamiseks liiga pulki täis ja nõuab alkoholilt leevendust. Aga panen siia ühe stiilinäite kah, üheainsa lause:

Eemal New Yorkis, sõida kiiresti võibolla jõuad viimaseks setiks kohale – 7. avenüül 139. ja 140. vahel hakkab „Yardbird“ Parker täna õhtul pihta saama, kuidas ta saab kasutada nendesamade akordide kõrgema otsa noote, võtmaks meloodia lahti issand halasta mis pagan see on mingi kuulipilduja või midagi ta on ikka peast täitsa segi 32. noodid kolmekümnekahendiknoodid ütle seda (kolmekümnekahendiknoodid) kiiresti peenikese häälega kui sa suudad uskuda seda Dan Wall’s Chili House’ist tulemas ja mööda tänavat kõlamas – raisk, igasugustel tänavatel (tema tripp aastaks ’39 juba ammu käimas: ta kõige jaatavamate soolode sügavikus tuututab juba vana Härra kuradi Surma enda logelev, amüsantne pomm-po-pommimine) üle eetri avalikele üritustele, ühel päeval niikaugele kui see, mis imbub välja peidetud kõlaritest linna liftides ja kõikides kauplustes, tema lind laulab, vääramaks Inimese hällilaule, kummutamaks lakkamatult, aralt ülemängitud keelte jõuetut uhtumist. . . .

Kadunud

Viimase aja kõige rohkem põnevust tekitanud sündmus mu jaoks oli, et avastasin Schellingi. Osati ka Hölderlini. Filosoofina, mitte luuletajana. Täpsemalt nende natuurfilosoofia ja eriti nende pidevad rõhutused organismide ja keskkondade tihedast põimitusest ja lahutamatusest. Eriti valmistas veidrat rahulolu Schellingi ninanips Fichtele, kelle õpilane ta pikka aega oli ja kes oli veendumusel, et filosoofial pole looduse või maailmaga vähimatki pistmist, kuna filosoofia peab tegelema üksi ja ainult inimintellekti subjektiivse tegevusega. Sellest mõttest loobununa käib Schelling tagantjäreletarkusega vaadates mööda tuttavat ja ootuspärast teed: objekt ja subjekt määratlevad teineteise, loodus ja tema vaatleja on lahutamatud ja on olemas vaid niivõrd kui on olemas vastav teinepool, jne. Mitte just üleliia originaalne, aga see oli ikkagi 1799, vaid loetud aastakesed pärast seda, kui Kant asjad-iseendast täiesti ja lõplikult "transtsendentaalsest subjektist" lahti raiub ning sellisest mõtteviisist suure osa lääne filosoofia peamine eeldus saab.

Mis kõik tähendab, et kuna Schellingi leidmine on olnud mu jaoks viimase nädala kõige huvitavam sündmus, siis on ilmselge, et kaon peagi reaalsusest.

"Kui inimene on üksi, kui ta teistega ei suhtle, siis ta kaotab tasapisi oma reaalsuse. Kui ta muidugi üldse alguses reaalne oli. Isegi kui oli, siis üksinduses ta hakkab varem või hiljem hõrenema. Ta hõreneb ja hõreneb, kuni kaob ära.

Teatud tüüpi inimesed muutuvad abstraktseks. Teoreetiliseks. Nagu matemaatilised ja geomeetrilised sümbolid või filosoofilised konstruktsioonid."

Mõõtmisest kui objektiivse tõe tingimusest

Kui üritan inimesi veenda, et loomulik vaade asjadele on suhtepõhine, ning et objektiivsuse-ideaal on justnimelt ideaal, ja sealjuures kättesaamatu ideaal, siis saan sageli järgmise vastuse: kui maailm poleks tegelik, reaalne, siis ei saaks teda kogu aeg stabiilselt, ühtede ja samade tulemustega mõõta. Mõõtmine, täpsemalt asjaolu, et igaüks võib midagi mõõta ja saada täpipealt sellesama tulemuse mis teised, on objektiivse, vaatlejast sõltumatu reaalsuse garantiiks. Sest kui maailm poleks reaalne, vaid mingi fiktsioon, siis asi ju nii ei oleks.

Lasen siinkohal kõrvust mööda tõsiasja, et sedasi väitja ei taipa, et suhtepõhisus ei tee valikut sellesama plassi objektiivse-subjektiivse skaala otste vahel. Väita, et teadmised ei ole objektiivsed, vaid suhtepõhised, ei ole absoluutselt seesama, mis väita, et teadmised on subjektiivsed. Kui objektiivsus ja subjektiivsus on diametraalsed vastandid, siis väide, et teadmised on suhtelised, eirab seda labast vastandust ning liigub neist teatud juhusliku nurga all eemale.

Huvitavam asi aga on hoopis see, et niivõrd konventsionaalset, kokkuleppelist, arbitraarset ja – jah – suhtepõhist tegevust nagu mõõtmine kujutletakse niivõrd sageli puhta, objektiivse reaalsuse garantiina. See asi tundub mulle veider ja see veidrus tuleb kergesti ilmseks, kui me lahti harutame, misasi õieti on üks mõõtmine. Võtame kõige lihtsama mõõdetava nähtuse üldse: pikkuse.

Kõigepealt, enne kui me saame üldse pihtagi hakata, on meil tarvis etaloni. Selleks võib olla ükskõik mis, näiteks mingi jupp lauda. Nüüd peame me saama korraldada nii, et see lauajupp oleks etalonina kõikidele vastuvõetav. Ühesõnaga, me peame kehtestama kokkuleppe. 1:0 suhtepõhisuse kasuks.

Teiseks, meil peab olema mingi arvusüsteem, mingi võimalus loendada, et mõõtmine üldse väljendatav oleks. Arvusüsteemide loomuse lahkamise jätan targematele inimestele, kuid on ilmselge, et me pole kuidagi kinni ühe ja sama süsteemi küljes: võime võtta kümnendik-, kuueteistkümnendik-, kahendiksüsteemi või välja mõelda enda oma. Igatahes on see valik vähemalt teatud osas arbitraarne. 2:0 suhtepõhisuse kasuks.

Kolmandaks, me tähistame oma kokkulepitud etaloni ühe vabalt valitud arvuga sellest arvusüsteemist. Tavaliselt on selleks lihtsuse huvides „1“, kuid see valik ei ole vältimatu. Ja igal juhul me kehtestame siin seose etaloni ja arvusüsteemi vahel, ehk siis seame sisse suhte abstraktse süsteemi ning täitsa tavalise lauajupi vahel. 3:0 suhtepõhisuse kasuks.

Ning lõpuks me hakkamegi päriselt midagi mõõtma. Et seda teha, hakkame me oma etaloni rakendama vastavalt lihtsale algoritmile. Täpsemalt: me teeme nii, et seame kas sedasama lauajuppi järjekorras, või hulka samasuguseid, etalonile vastavaid lauajuppe külg-külje kõrvale, kohakuti asjaga, mille pikkust tahame mõõta, ja seda nii, et iga kord, kui asetame uue jupi, liigume ühe liikme võrra arvujadas edasi. Ja neid lauajupi-etalone asetame me senikaua, kuni jõuame mõõdetava asja lõpuni välja, mispeale me kuulutame, et selle asja „pikkus“ on võrdne selle arvuga, milleni me loendades jõudsime. 4:0 suhtepõhisuse kasuks. Või on siin viimases punktis niipalju suhtepõhist, kokkuleppelist ja arbitraarsust, et peaks ütlema juba 5:0 või 6:0?

Mõõtmine on klassikaliselt suhtepõhine tegevus. Ta sõltub kokkulepetest, on osaliselt arbitraarne, ning vajab tegelike tegutsejate aktiivset tegevust. Ning mõõtmiste kooskõla kehtib vaid niikaua, kuni kõik tegutsejad on valmis järgima kõiki ülalpool kirjeldatud kokkuleppeid. Mõõtmine on praktika, millega tegelevad teadmiste saamise nimel ühed täiesti reaalsed olendid, kes suhete loomise teel katsuvad midagi aru saada. Puhast, mõistusevaba tegelikkust ei sobi mõõtmine küll kohe mitte kuidagi tõestama.

Tegelikkuse tingimus

Tegelik ehk reaalne on kõik see, mis jääb alles isegi siis kui ühtegi inimest enam olemas ei oleks. Ta on kõik see, mis jääb täpselt samasuguseks edasi ka siis, kui mitte ühtegi vaatlejat pole seda reaalsust vaatamas, ühtegi mõistust seda takseerimas, vaimu ette kujutamas. Lühidalt, reaalsus on vaimust ehk mõistusest sõltumatu.

Niisugune on tõenäoliselt kõige levinum viis määratleda, misasi see päris, füüsiline tegelikkus lõppude lõpuks ikkagi täpselt on. Tegemist on päris kindlasti sellele küsimusele vastamise kõige populaarsema viisiga, mis on sedavõrd juurdunud, et jääb mulje, nagu polekski siin enam midagi küsida või arutleda. Enamgi veel – see on ju ometi naturalistliku või füsikalistliku, loodusteadustel põhineva maailmavaate alustugi, selle peamine tingimus. Just seda tähendabki ju see tõeline, füüsiline, ikka päris-päris tegelikkus, et ta pole mingi pelk väljamõeldis ega puhas fiktsioon, vaimusünnitis!

Mulle tundub see arusaam „tegelikkusest“ pentsik. Ja seda seepärast, et – väga lihtsalt ja lühidalt öeldes – selline määratlus seab reaalsuse tingimuseks vaatleja ebareaalsuse. See väide ütleb meile, et asjad on tegelikud vaid niivõrd kuni vaatleja seda ei ole. Kui tegelik ehk reaalne on kõik see, mis jääb alles, kui inimesi või nende mõistust enam pole, siis see ju automaatselt tähendab, et inimesed või nende mõistused võib tegelikest asjadest koosnevast maailmast välja arvata, ilma et maailm ja tema tegelikkus sellest midagi kaotaks. Justkui ei võetakski ära midagi reaalset. Tegelikkus, „päris“ on siin määratletud seeläbi, ning ta seisab püsti vaid selle najal, et mõistus või meel või vaatleja ei olegi justkui päris, ei olegi arvestamiskõlblikud osad tegelikust maailmast. Ometigi peaks ju vaatleja koos oma meele ja meeltega olema mingi jupp justkui sellestsamast maailmast, või kuidas? Seda ju naturalistlik maailmapilt ometi tähendabki? Kui reaalsus on vaimust ehk mõistusest lahus, kõlab see mu kõrvule justkui väitena, et päris on päris vaid niikaua, kuni seda päristet tajuja ise ei ole päris.

Mismoodi on selline arusaam naturalistlik, füsikalistlik, loodusteaduslik? Ta ju hoopis sõna otseses mõttes ei ole seda, vastupidi, tegemist on müstitsismiga, kuna see ripub ära mõistuse ebareaalsusest, vaatluse fiktiivsusest. Ometigi peaks naturalistlik vaade tähendama, et kõik, ka inimesed, ka nende ajud, nende vaatlusaktid on reaalsed, tegeliku maailma osad, ja inimesed – evolutsiooni käigus välja kujunenud loomad, kelle tegevus võib olla küll päris eripärane, aga siiski täiesti tavaliselt bioloogiline. Me vaatame maailma seest maailma sisse, mitte ei hõlju selle kohal kehatute vaimudena, kelle väljajätt asjade korrast seal reaalses maailmas mitte midagi ei muuda. Natualistlik seisukoht peaks ju ilmselgelt viima seisukohani, et inimesed pole mitte kuidagi maailma kohale kerkinud, mingile kehatule puhta mõistuse positsioonile, kust nad saavad kõike vaadata olgu kas objektiivselt või subjektiivselt, aga igatahes nii, et sel vaatamisel endal pole mitte mingit rolli selles, milline maailm paistab, kuna ta on ebareaalne.

Seda keskset tegelikkuse-tingimust võib muidugi mõista veel teisiti. Võidakse näiteks väita, et asja tuum on selles, et maailma esemed on tegelikud kuidagi omaette, iseenesest, sellal kui vaadelda tähendab tekitada teatud sorti suhe nende omaette asjade ning mingi vaatleja vahel. Ja et ebareaalne ei ole siis mitte vaatleja iseenesest, vaid just see suhe.

See väide liigub juba õigemas suunas, kuigi kuidas peaks mõistma väidet, et kui meil on siin maailmas kaks täitsa tavalist, loomulikku asja, näiteks kivi ja seda vaatlev elusolend inimese näol, ning kui viimane seda oma täiesti tavaliste silmadega vaatab ning oma täitsa orgaanilisest ainest tehtud neuronitega kontempleerib, siis mingil moel tuleb siia vahele veel midagi ebareaalset. Misasi täpsemalt?

Paradoksaalsel kombel viib just loodusteaduslik vaade – et me oleme tavalised orgaanilised elusolendid, kes on kasvanud ja kujunenud koos teistegi elusolenditega ning kes koosnevad vaid valkudest ja muust säärasest – järelduseni, et iga inimese teadmisakt on loomult suhtepõhine. Objektiivne vaade, et asjad on mis nad on sõltumata sellest, kes ja kus ja kuidas neid vaatab, tühistab iseenda. Just see loodusteaduslik, naturalistlik pööre, mis asetab inimese füüsilisse maailmasse tagasi ega luba tal enam puhas vaim olla, toob oma „objektiivse“ pilgu all esile, et igasugune teadmine on paratamatult relatsiooniline, ning et see suhtepõhisus on midagi täiesti tegelikku, osa reaalsest maailmast ning seda konstitueeriv. Objektiivsuse-ideaal on nonsens senikaua, kuni tema alustalaks on inimese väljaarvamine maailmast, tema teadmisaktide ebareaalsus, mingi puhas „subjektiivsus“. Tõeliselt naturalistlik vaade on suhtepõhine: see on arusaam teadmistest kui asjast, mis tekib, kui üks eripärane osa maailmast suhtleb sellesama maailma mõne teise osaga – kui tekib nendevaheline suhe. Oma juurtelt on kujutlus vaid inimmõistusele omasest puhtast ratsionaalsusest, mille abil saab tunnetada puhast tegelikkust nii nagu see „päriselt“ ja vaatlejast sõltumata on, teoloogiline: ta tuleneb Piiblist pärit ettekujutusele, et inimene, ainus olend, kes on loodud jumala näo järgi, jagab osaliselt Jumala kõiketeadvat loomust. Nii nagu Piibel, on ka loodus Jumala raamat, ning kuna Jumal on eksimatu, on seda ka loodus, ning nii nagu ka Piiblit, saab ka loodustki lugeda nii, et saadakse sellest õigesti, ainutõesel viisil aru.

Ei maksa vist rõhutadagi, kui anakronistlik on selline fiktsioon objektiivse pilgu olemusest. Naturalistlik vaade, mis ei sõltu religioossest müstitsismist, on suhtepõhine. Ta on vaade, mille kohaselt iga teadmine on relatsioon kahe maailma sisese nähtuse vahel. Ta on vaatleja pilk maailma seest sellesama maailma sisse, mis ilmub talle vaid niikaua, kuni ta ise koos kõikide oma taju- ja tunnetusportsessidega tegelikult, füüsiliselt, orgaaniliselt maailma sees olemas on. Ning tema taju- ja tunnetusaktid on samuti sellesama maailma reaalsed osad. Muidugi on siin lõpmatu hulk küsimusi vaatleja, vaadeldava ja vaatlusakti enda olemuse kohta, kuid oma tuumalt jääb tees püsima: tõeliselt naturalistlik arusaam asjadest on suhtepõhine, ja seda vältimatult.

The Wonderful World of Climate Change Denial "Science" (2)

In 2004, Naomi Oreskes published in the journal Science a meta-analysis of peer-reviewed scientific articles dealing with global climate change, and found that 75% of the papers agreed that detrimental anthropogenic climate change is real. This of course caused a terrible furore among the denial crowd, and inevitably one of them, by the name of Benny Peiser, decided to prove her wrong by replicating the research results. And unsurprisingly he found out that Oreskes is all wrong and that there are in fact just 1% of supporting papers, and he also claimed to have found 34 papers that were left out by Oreskes. But unsurprisingly, when he put his stuff on the net (Science refused to publish them), and when his results were reviewed, Peiser was revealed a typical deceptive denier. The analysis of his claims resulted in the following conclusion

So to summarize, Dr Peiser has made 4 errors in his research:

1. Dr Peiser failed to replicate Dr Oreskes search properly.

2. Dr Peiser compounded the previous error by assuming that Dr Oreskes got her figures wrong, rather than contacting Dr Oreskes to obtain her search criteria.

3. Of the 34 abstracts identified by Dr Peiser that reject or question the view that human activities are the main driving force of the observed warming over the last 50 years, 12 are not in Dr Oreskes sample.

Of the remaining 22 articles, 21 do not fit that description (one argues that natural factors have been underestimated still does not reject or doubt that human activities are the main factor). In other words Dr Peiser has misinterpreted the abstracts of 21 articles.

4. Only one fits Dr Peiser's category, but it does not fit Oreskes' criteria of being a piece of published peer-reviewed research, but is instead a statement by the American Association of Petroleum Geologists. Dr Oreskes removed this from her sample partly because the statements by the AMS, AOG, & AAAS are not in her sample either.

But it gets better! The thing is, Peiser himself participated in the various discussions that analyzed his claims. He replies in a typical denier fashion - by failing to address any of the actual substantial comments, and by continuing his absurd accusations. Even though his gross errors were pointed out to him, he ignored the refutations. Several days later, he repeats his assertions on a different website, where people are not aware of the refutation. In short, Peiser doesn't try to stand by his argument where the audience is aware that it is wrong, and then repeats the argument to a different audience while being aware that it is wrong. This is typical dishonesty and deception, virulent in the climate change denial crowd.

Onward!

The results of the petition which I discussed below, spread by the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, with the fraudulent pseudo-scientific attachment, has often used by climate change deniers as "proof" that over 19 000 scientists think global climate change is a myth. So who were some of these scientists who signed the petition? Well, there were several fictional characters and celebrities, including John Grisham, Michael J. Fox, Drs. Frank Burns, B. J. Honeycutt, and Benjamin Pierce (from the TV show M*A*S*H), an individual by the name of "Dr. Red Wine," and Geraldine Halliwell, formerly known as pop singer Ginger Spice of the Spice Girls.

In fact, the petition was published online, and pretty much anyone could sign it. This of course didn't stop the deniers from using the petition as "evidence" that there is no consensus among scientists.

Oh, and the paper was co-authored by the 22-year-old son of the author, Zachary, home-schooled by his dad.

But there's even more fun stuff!

Everybody's heard the denial side repeat this mantra: that because regular climate measurements have been taken for such a short time (at best for about 150 years, but more often 30-50 years), there is no sufficient data to make long-time predictions, especially in light of the fact that it is well-known that the Earth has once been covered by ice up to the equator, and at other times the poles have been covered with green vegetation.
This is of course sound advice, and all environmentalists should always keep it in mind. But my question here is: do the climate change deniers follow their own advice? And the now-predictable answer is of course "no".

In 2001, the ExxonMobil-fueled climate skeptic Richard Lindzen came up with the idea that the increase in global CO2 emissions is in fact thwarted by something called "adaptive infrared iris", or a sort of feedback loop that has to do with water vapour. The technical details are irrelevant for us here. But when the deniers heard of this, they of course went all gaga about it and again claimed the entire climate science has been overturned, and that IPCC's climate sensitivity range should be decreased by a factor of at least three.

So what was the basis for his claims? A few years' worth of data collected in just a single small area of one ocean. As Stephen Schneider comments: Extrapolating this small sample of data to the entire globe is like extrapolating the strong destabilizing feedback over midcontinental landmasses as snow melts during the spring - such an inappropriate projection would likely increase estimates of climate sensitivity by a factor of several.

But in the hypocritical world of climate change denial, only other scientists cannot use insufficient, local and short time-span data. For climate change denial, this is perfectly fine, and represents sound science.

The Wonderful World of Climate Change Denial "Science" (1)

For a quite some time, I was naive and innocent about the topic of global climate change and its causes. You see, I assumed most people treat the subject just like they would treat any fledging scientific field – with interest, a healthy skepticism, and in general, a wait-and-see attitude. Then I chanced upon the climate change deniers and their absolutely wonderful world. And what a strange world it is! Filled with hypocrisy, lies and deception, it can get truly depressing if taken seriously. But most of the climate change denial „science” is so easily debunked and provides such excellent examples of fanatical, even cultist approaches to what they consider a „healthy skepticism” that laughing at their expense has become a sort of a past-time for me. I’m a very wicked individual, you see. And remember, kids: pointing and laughing at climate change deniers is not only allowed, it is encouraged.

So anyways, here are a couple of examples of „science” according to climate change deniers. Enjoy!

The first example comes from George Monbiot. You can read his blog here. He writes:

„On April 16th, New Scientist published a letter from the famous botanist David Bellamy. Many of the world’s glaciers, he claimed, "are not shrinking but in fact are growing. ... 555 of all the 625 glaciers under observation have been growing since 1980."”

The World Glacier Monitoring Service responded to this, calling it complete bullshit, and said that „he had cited data which was simply false, failed to provide references, completely misunderstood the scientific context and neglected current scientific literature”.

However, Bellamy got his numbers from somewhere. After some more digging, Monbiot discovers the source: a magazine called „21st Century Science and Technology”, published by one Lyndon Larouche. So who is this Larouche character? A climatologist? A scientist of any kind? A real expert on the field? Of course not. In fact, he is a criminal who has served 15 years in prison for conspiracy, mail fraud and tax code violations. He is also a paranoid conspiracy theoriest. He has claimed that the British royal family is running an international drugs syndicate, that Henry Kissinger is a communist agent, that the British government is controlled by Jewish bankers, and that modern science is a conspiracy against human potential. The last bit is especially great, since it makes us realize that Bellamy, the great climate change denial scientist in fact quotes a magazine that claims: „We in LaRouche’s Youth Movement find ourselves in combat with an old enemy that destroys human beings... it is empiricism.”

Okay, so climate change deniers are forced to quote convicted criminals and self-purported „enemies of empiricism” for their „proofs”. But as we proceed, we’ll realize that deception, lies and hypocrisy pretty much a standard in the wonderful world of climate change denial. For example, in 1999, an organization called the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine started circulating a petition to plead the US government to reject the Kyoto Protocol. This petition was accompanied by a document with purported „scientific” evidence, claiming that „proposed limits on greenhouse gases would harm the environment, hinder the advance of science and technology, and damage the health and welfare of mankind.” This document was presented in a format identical to that of the peer-reviewed journal “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences”. Yet the document was never published in this journal, nor in any other peer-reviewed scientific journal. It was merely designed to look like it has, to deceive people into accepting its message. And I suppose it is unsurprising that the author of the document, George C Marshall Institute, has received $515,000 from ExxonMobil since 1998. Again we see that deception is the key to climate change denial “science”.

But let us proceed! Looking into climate change denial “science”, one often comes across a book called “The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World”, by one Bjørn Lomborg, which was actually published by Cambridge University Press, in 2001. The deniers like to quote this book to prove that the world’s ecosystems are completely well-off and are in fact getting better! Great!

So who is this Lomborg fellow? Surely a climatologist, a scientist dedicated to put the crazy tree-hugging eco-fascists and new-ageists in their proper places, right? Obviously, not at all. Bjørn Lomborg is an associate professor of statistics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus. He has a Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. Truly reassuring and worthy credentials for a person about to debunk all the world’s climatologists and environmental scientists!

Initially, his book received good reviews from rather reputable sources, such as the New York Times and The Economist, and for many libertarian cultists, it became a veritable bible for bashing all the “doomsayers”. Unsurprisingly, none of the positive reviews were written by actual specialists in fields this book covers. So what happened when the experts reviewed the book? Things got a completely different turn. The Scientific American wrote:

“The problem with Lomborg's conclusion is that the scientists themselves disavow it. Many spoke to us at Scientific American about their frustration at what they described as Lomborg's misrepresentation of their fields. His seemingly dispassionate outsider's view, they told us, is often marred by an incomplete use of the data or a misunderstanding of the underlying science. Even where his statistical analyses are valid, his interpretations are frequently off the mark--literally not seeing the state of the forests for the number of the trees, for example. And it is hard not to be struck by Lomborg's presumption that he has seen into the heart of the science more faithfully than have investigators who have devoted their lives to it; it is equally curious that he finds the same contrarian good news lurking in every diverse area of environmental science.”

In fact, the very authors whom Lomborg quotes as supporting his arguments denounce him.

But wait! It gets better! Because of several complaints, the book was brought to the attention of the Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty. I quote bits from their ruling, and I’ll even mark the best bits italic.

DCSD's position

On the basis of the material adduced by the complainants, and particularly the assessment in Scientific American, DCSD deems it to have been adequately substantiated that the defendant, who has himself insisted on presenting his publication in scientific form and not allowing the book to assume the appearance of a provocative debate-generating paper, based on customary scientific standards and in light of his systematic one-sidedness in the choice of data and line of argument, has clearly acted at variance with good scientific practice.

Subject to the proviso that the book is to be evaluated as science, there has been such perversion of the scientific message in the form of systematically biased representation that the objective criteria for upholding scientific dishonesty have been met. In consideration of the extraordinarily wide-ranging scientific topics dealt with by the defendant without having any special scientific expertise, however, DCSD has not found-or felt able to procure-sufficient grounds to deem that the defendant has misled his readers deliberately or with gross negligence.

In accordance herewith and subject to the proviso that the book under review is to be evaluated as science, DCSD has arrived at the following

Ruling:

Objectively speaking, the publication of the work under consideration is deemed to fall within the concept of scientific dishonesty.

In view of the subjective requirements made in terms of intent or gross negligence, however, Bjørn Lomborg's publication cannot fall within the bounds of this characterization. Conversely, the publication is deemed clearly contrary to the standards of good scientific practice.

Anyone notice a pattern here?

More to come….

Kuidas saada suureks kirjanikuks (1)

Kuidas saada kirjanikuks, mõtlesin. Keegi vastas (vist mõistuse hääl, aga võib-olla kuulsin seda ka raadiost): tuleb lihtsalt kirjutada, kirjutamine on justnagu pillimäng – mitte Suurte Inspiratsioonide katkematu ahel, vaid praktiline oskus, mida tuleb lihvida järjepideva kirjapanemise läbi. Nüüd siis kirjutangi, mõistuse hääle kutsel. Kirjutan sellest, kuidas saada kirjanikuks läbi pideva kirjutamise.

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Paistab, et mu kavalal ideel on ilmnenud probleem – nimelt ma olengi selle kohta juba kõik ära kirjutanud, ja mitte midagi ei ole lisamiseks üle jäänud. Kirjutamisest on küllalt vähe kirjutada, ilmneb. Järelikult tuleb võtta mastaapsemalt: kirjutan siia hoopis sellest, kuidas ma saan suureks kirjanikuks. Suureks kirjanikuks saamiseks tuleb esmalt hakata kogu aeg kirjutama (vaata ülalpool). Tuleb muudkui kirjutada ja kirjutada, näiteks sääraseid lauseid nagu see siin, või siis need, mis ma sinna ülespoole juba kirjutasin. Ja ka järgnevad laused (nagu näiteks see, mida ma praegu kirjutan), käivad selle alla. Kuigi see pole tegelikult järgmine lause, järgmine on hoopis see. Või see. Põhimõtteliselt pole muu oluline, kui et sa kogu aeg muudkui ainult kirjutad.

Igatahes, tegelikult ma ajasin kõik sassi: suureks kirjanikuks saamine ei alga üldse mitte kirjutamisest. See algab hoopis nimevalikust. Nimevalimine on kõige olulisem asi kirjanikuks saamise juures, sest ainult läbi selle saad kirjanikuks Sina, muudel juhtudel saab kirjanikuks keegi teine või siis Mittekeegi. Välja arvatud juhul, kui sa oled kaval (ja kaval ma olen, seda võin teile küll tunnistada). Kaval võib olla näiteks niimoodi: valid endale nimeks Eimillegi!

Sellega on jälle see probleem, et inimesed ei oska Eimidagi näha. Näituseks kui ma panen raamatu kaanele autori nime koha peale tühimiku või kirjutan lihtsalt „Mitte keegi”, hakkavad nad kõigepealt segadusse sattunult pobisema: „Aga kes autor on? Kes selle toreda, mitte väga paksu, kuid siiski oma raha väärt oleva, meeldivalt krabisevate kaante ning lõhnavate lehtedega oopusega maha siis lõppude-lõpuks saigi? Vaat, kus on mõistatus!“ Nad ei saa aru, et mitte autor pole Eimiski või Mittekeegi, vaid mitte keegi pole autor.

Aga kaval on see nipp sellepärast: sa kuulutad, et sind pole, ning selle läbi topid selle polematuse kõikidele suhu ja kõrvade vahele!

Vahekokkuvõte: nüüdseks oleme jõudnud tõdemuseni: see lugu käib nii, et ma hakkan algusest peale kirjutama, ja kui lõpuni jõuan, siis olengi suur kirjanik, ja siis inimesed loevad ja vaatavadki, et ahhaa, niimoodi see siis käibki, see paljuräägitud Suureks Kirjanikuks saamine!

Muide, mul on veel üks nipp varuks. Selle nipi nimi on Postmodernism! Teate, kuidas see käib? Las ma selgitan: kui sul ideed otsa saavad, siis sa kirjutad kuskilt maha.

Ahjaa, seda kah veel, et kõik kirjanikud kirjutavad alati iseendast. Muu jaoks neil üldiselt aega ei jää. Nii et ma teen kah seda nüüd. Näiteks nõnda: raamatu Peategelasel (ehk Protagonistil) on sõber Sven (nimi ära vahetatud), kes kirjutas raamatu Postmodernismist. Seda, kas ta Postmodernismist kirjutades kah kõik maha kirjutas, või tohib seda teha ainult siis, kui sa kirjutad Postmodernistlikult, kuid mitte siis, kui sa kirjutad Postmodernismist endast, seda ta ei öelnud. Teiseks on Peategelasel (ehk Protagonistil) veel teine sõber Janek (nimi ära vahetatud, eelmisega) kellele meeldib kirjutada lastest, kes jäävad väiksemateks, ning magmast. Ta avaldab neid lugusid ajakrijas Vikerkaar ja nädalalehes Sirp, sest ta on literaat. Sest literaadid teevad niiviisi.

Kui autor on Peategelase (ehk Protagonisti) sõbrad ära seletanud, läheb ta edasi kõige põnevama juurde: hakkab vaagima iseenda salaprobleeme. Enamasti on need kirjandusteaduses seotud Autori (ehk Peategelase) isa nimega, ning sellega, et ta näeb ennast peeglist. Kirjandusteadlaste jaoks algab iga asi tegelikult sealt. Pärast tuleb Reaalsus, aga see juhtub hiljem.

Feeling pain

One of the most traditional ways of separating those who fall under ethical deliberations and those who don’t, is the idea of feeling pain. It is usually conceded that we should treat all those who feel pain in a considerate manner, so as not to cause them pain and harm through our activities.

This is undeniably a worthy goal, but I feel that in discussing this, often the wrong questions are asked, or rather, the easy and implausible solution is offered to the question: „Who feels pain?” The typical answer would be: those who have a central nervous system, which is clearly a mechanism that is capable, among other things, to cause the sensation of pain. I find this simple answer to be lacking.

A better question, in my mind, would not be „who feels pain?” but rather „why is there such a thing we call pain?” And the answer to this question will force us to considerably expand our notion that only living organisms with a sufficiently developend nervous system fall under ethical considerations.

The function of pain is of course not a big mystery. Wikipedia sums it up nicely:

„Despite its unpleasantness, pain is an important part of the existence of humans and other animals; in fact, it is vital to survival. Pain encourages an organism to disengage from the noxious stimulus associated with the pain. /.../ Pain may also promote the healing process, since most organisms will protect an injured region in order to avoid further pain.”

With this in mind, it should be clear that if pain serves such a clear evolutionary function, then all evolved mechanisms or processes that serve the same function should be considered pain-like, and organisms that have such mechanisms or processes should fall under ethical consideration. The question is not whether a particular member of a species is capable of feeling pain; rather, it is whether such organisms have a function or process that serves the same function that pain does for us. And if they do, we should include them in our ethics. Needless to say, the number of such species is vastly larger than those with nervous systems, and would include plants and insects and probably even microbes of various sorts.

Concerning that old fictional Chinese encyclopedia

Jorge Luis Borges originally wrote this bit, claiming that "a certain Chinese encyclopedia tells us that animals are divided into:

a) belonging to the Emperor,

b) embalmed,

c) tame,

d) sucking pigs,

e) sirens,

f) fabulous,

g) stray dogs,

h) included in the present classification,

i) frenzied,

j) innumerable,

k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,

l) et cetera,

m) having just broken the water pitcher,

n) that from a long way off look like flies."

Probably one of the most immediate reactions to this (admittedly fictional) list is that it is completely irrational, illogical and nonsensical. However, one should be careful to call anything arbitrary, let alone irrational or illogical. Without knowing the purpose, principles, assumptions and other reasons for creating such a list, we can pass no appropriate judgements. A quick comparison with our own taxonomies sheds light on why this list may not be as arbitrary as it initally seems.

The most common classification system in Western cultures - the one based on the alphabet - is probably the most arbitrary in existence today. It is based on the sequence of phonemes in an arbitrary linguistic sign, which is compared to an arbitrarily arranged list of all such phonemes. The result is a jumble of totally unrelated concepts, much more arbitrary than what we'd get if we applied the Chinese method. Can we call this system illogical and irrational? I think not, for its purpose is ease and speed of reference, which is a very reasonable purpose.

Another example from our own society: an encyclopedia that describes, for example, plants based on their genus and species, or their apparences, or something similar, is quite a modern invention, being no more than about 300 years old. One of the most interesting type of texts I've ever read are 16th - 17th century encyclopedias that all had one lofty and rational goal: a Baconian desire to name and describe everything that pertains to any given entity. What can be more rational and logical in an encyclopedia than describing all aspects of a given thing? Isn't that what an encyclopedia is supposed to be, wouldn't such a book be in fact a paragon of Encyclopedias? And what was the result? A confusing mess of absurd information that mostly had nothing to do with anything: an amalgamation of physical descriptions, descriptions of uses, cooking recipes, seamen tales, myths, parables, anecdotes, even songs and poems. Books that had little or no practical value because it was impossible to make heads or tails out of the jumble that had been gathered in them. These books are much more arbitrary and confusing than what we'd get if we applied the Chinese taxonomy - yet the goal is both lofty and at least seemingly rational and sensible.

Such systems of thought as exemplified by the fictional Chinese encyclopedia seem illogical only as long as we fail to understand their inner structure, purpose and principles of composition. Of course the list is arbitrary to an extent, but not much more so than the ones we ourselves use. The only reason why our own taxonomies do not seem irrational and nonsensical to us is, unfortunately, just habituation.

Claims of sciences turned into world-views

"Every new economic and social revolution in history has been accompanied by a new explanation of the creation of life and the workings of nature. The new concept of nature is always the most important strand of the matrix that makes up any new social order. In each instance, the new cosmology serves to justify the rightness and inevitability of the new way human beings are organizing their world by suggesting that nature itself is organized along similar lines. [...] Our concepts of nature are utterly, unabashedly, almost embarassingly anthropocentric. The laws of nature are being re-written to conform with our latest manipulation of the natural world."

- Jeremy Rifkin, "The Biotech Century"

A few examples are in order.

The clockwork metaphor invented during the Enlightenment - that the world is a big mechanism that keeps ticking like a clock - coincided with the spree of mechanical inventions, automatons of various kinds. To this day we make use of mechanistic, or engineering vocabulary, even when they're clearly not apt.

Atomism - the idea that the only 'real' truth lies at the bottom of things, at the level of constituent elements - came to be during the advent of particle physics.

The idea that human brains are actually hardware running software, that human beings are in fact just computers, and the world is in fact just information - take a wild guess as to what technological advancement lies at the bottom of this myth.

Then there's the myth of evolution - that everything necessarily and inevitably 'evolves', which is often understood as "gets better", and that the survival of the fittest is an universal and inevitable part of everything everywhere.

And finally, the fancy contemporary myth - genetics. Everything is just genes and we are just vehicles for our genes, and everything is determined by genes, yet somehow, and rather surprisingly, we are able to control the genetic makeup of everything thorugh genetic engineering. In common parlance, "in the genes" has essentially replaced the old "in the blood".

I whole-heartedly agree with Rifkin. We as humans should really have a reality check, and get rid of the self-serving anthropocentrism that permeates our every living moment.

Objection: Perhaps humans are only adopting their worldviews to better fit with their increasing knowledge of that world.

Reply: If they did that, they would not turn every new fad into a metaphysical explanation of Life, Universe and Everything. They would realize that new evidence in a particular field has extended their understanding of that particular field, and perhaps additionally in some related fields. They would not make up things like social darwinism and behaviorism and sociobiology. The problem is that new methods or findings in a particular field are extended to where they are not apt.