September 14, 2005

Concerning that old fictional Chinese encyclopedia

Jorge Luis Borges originally wrote this bit, claiming that "a certain Chinese encyclopedia tells us that animals are divided into:

a) belonging to the Emperor,

b) embalmed,

c) tame,

d) sucking pigs,

e) sirens,

f) fabulous,

g) stray dogs,

h) included in the present classification,

i) frenzied,

j) innumerable,

k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,

l) et cetera,

m) having just broken the water pitcher,

n) that from a long way off look like flies."


Probably one of the most immediate reactions to this (admittedly fictional) list is that it is completely irrational, illogical and nonsensical. However, one should be careful to call anything arbitrary, let alone irrational or illogical. Without knowing the purpose, principles, assumptions and other reasons for creating such a list, we can pass no appropriate judgements. A quick comparison with our own taxonomies sheds light on why this list may not be as arbitrary as it initally seems.


The most common classification system in Western cultures - the one based on the alphabet - is probably the most arbitrary in existence today. It is based on the sequence of phonemes in an arbitrary linguistic sign, which is compared to an arbitrarily arranged list of all such phonemes. The result is a jumble of totally unrelated concepts, much more arbitrary than what we'd get if we applied the Chinese method. Can we call this system illogical and irrational? I think not, for its purpose is ease and speed of reference, which is a very reasonable purpose.


Another example from our own society: an encyclopedia that describes, for example, plants based on their genus and species, or their apparences, or something similar, is quite a modern invention, being no more than about 300 years old. One of the most interesting type of texts I've ever read are 16th - 17th century encyclopedias that all had one lofty and rational goal: a Baconian desire to name and describe everything that pertains to any given entity. What can be more rational and logical in an encyclopedia than describing all aspects of a given thing? Isn't that what an encyclopedia is supposed to be, wouldn't such a book be in fact a paragon of Encyclopedias? And what was the result? A confusing mess of absurd information that mostly had nothing to do with anything: an amalgamation of physical descriptions, descriptions of uses, cooking recipes, seamen tales, myths, parables, anecdotes, even songs and poems. Books that had little or no practical value because it was impossible to make heads or tails out of the jumble that had been gathered in them. These books are much more arbitrary and confusing than what we'd get if we applied the Chinese taxonomy - yet the goal is both lofty and at least seemingly rational and sensible.


Such systems of thought as exemplified by the fictional Chinese encyclopedia seem illogical only as long as we fail to understand their inner structure, purpose and principles of composition. Of course the list is arbitrary to an extent, but not much more so than the ones we ourselves use. The only reason why our own taxonomies do not seem irrational and nonsensical to us is, unfortunately, just habituation.

Claims of sciences turned into world-views

"Every new economic and social revolution in history has been accompanied by a new explanation of the creation of life and the workings of nature. The new concept of nature is always the most important strand of the matrix that makes up any new social order. In each instance, the new cosmology serves to justify the rightness and inevitability of the new way human beings are organizing their world by suggesting that nature itself is organized along similar lines. [...] Our concepts of nature are utterly, unabashedly, almost embarassingly anthropocentric. The laws of nature are being re-written to conform with our latest manipulation of the natural world."

- Jeremy Rifkin, "The Biotech Century"


A few examples are in order.


The clockwork metaphor invented during the Enlightenment - that the world is a big mechanism that keeps ticking like a clock - coincided with the spree of mechanical inventions, automatons of various kinds. To this day we make use of mechanistic, or engineering vocabulary, even when they're clearly not apt.


Atomism - the idea that the only 'real' truth lies at the bottom of things, at the level of constituent elements - came to be during the advent of particle physics.


The idea that human brains are actually hardware running software, that human beings are in fact just computers, and the world is in fact just information - take a wild guess as to what technological advancement lies at the bottom of this myth.


Then there's the myth of evolution - that everything necessarily and inevitably 'evolves', which is often understood as "gets better", and that the survival of the fittest is an universal and inevitable part of everything everywhere.


And finally, the fancy contemporary myth - genetics. Everything is just genes and we are just vehicles for our genes, and everything is determined by genes, yet somehow, and rather surprisingly, we are able to control the genetic makeup of everything thorugh genetic engineering. In common parlance, "in the genes" has essentially replaced the old "in the blood".


I whole-heartedly agree with Rifkin. We as humans should really have a reality check, and get rid of the self-serving anthropocentrism that permeates our every living moment.

Objection: Perhaps humans are only adopting their worldviews to better fit with their increasing knowledge of that world.

Reply: If they did that, they would not turn every new fad into a metaphysical explanation of Life, Universe and Everything. They would realize that new evidence in a particular field has extended their understanding of that particular field, and perhaps additionally in some related fields. They would not make up things like social darwinism and behaviorism and sociobiology. The problem is that new methods or findings in a particular field are extended to where they are not apt.

Three possibilities of knowledge

We have an impulse to seek knowledge at higher and higher levels, defined by ever more general categories of things. Once we have started on this search for higher and higher categories and essences, there are three possible alternatives:


1. The world may not be systematically organized, or we may not be able to know it, above a certain level of generalization, which might even be relatively low in the hierarchy of categories. In other words, there may be a limit to the systematicity of the world or to its intelligibility.


2. The hierarchy of categories may go on indefinitely, with no level at which an all-inclusive category exists. In this case, the world might be systematic, but not completely intelligible. The process of gaining knowledge of the world would be an infinite, and hence uncompleteable, task.


3. The iteration up the hierarchy of categories and essences might terminate with an all-inclusive category, whose essence would explain the nature of all things. Only in his case would the world be totally intelligible, at least in principle.


The endlessly optimistic scientists presuppose no. 3. Why? Scientists should be skeptical and wary, yet they have chosen the least skeptical, most hopeful and idealized alternative. I see no reason to, except wishful thinking. I'm personally inclined towards alternative 2, myself.

This is not really a question about science per se but about the metaphysical assumptions underlying any search for knowledge. For there is already this presupposed all-inclusive category in metaphysics: being. The main difference between 2 and 3 is that 2 rejects 'being' as a meaningful category. 3 brings with itself a metaphysical presupposition, that there is a category of Being, and since there is also a common metaphysical theory of essences (all things have a collection of properties that makes it the kind of thing it is), it follows that Being must have an essence, so there is an Essence of Being. (2) rejects this, and this I see as the main boon of this approach.

The idea of an idea

I found this little idea when browsing Edge. The question asked from many a prominent thinker was, "What is the most important invention in the past two thousand years?" And one of the best replies in my opinion was that of George Lakoff, who replied:


"As a cognitive linguist whose job is to study conceptual systems, both conscious and unconscious, I was struck by what was meant by "invention."


• The most concrete "inventions" proposed have been gadgets, mechanical or biological — the printing press, the computer, the birth control pill.


• A step way from the concrete specific technical innovations are specific technical inventions of a mental character: Gödel's Theorem, Arabic numbers, the nongeocentric universe, the theory of evolution, the theory of computation.

• A step away from those are the general innovations of a mental character in specific domains like science and politics, e.g., the scientific method and democracy. I would like to go a step further and talk about the invention that was causally necessary for all of the above:


• The most basic fully general invention of a mental character is The Idea of an Idea.

THE IDEA OF AN IDEA

It's a bit more than 2,000, more like 2,500 years, at least in the West. It is an 'invention" in the sense that human beings actively and consciously thought it up: to my knowledge, it is not the case that every indigenous culture around the world objectifies the notion of an idea, making it a thing that can be consciously constructed.


What is required for all other human inventions is the notion that one can actively, consciously construct new ideas. We take this for granted, but it is not a "natural" development. Three-year-old children have lots of ideas and even make up new ideas. But they do not have the Idea of an Idea that they can construct anew; they do not naturally arrive at the idea that making up new ideas is something people do. The Idea of an Idea is a cultural creation that children have to learn.


It is only with the Idea of an Idea that we get conscious specific intellectual constructions like democracy, science, the number system, the computer, the birth control pill, and so on. The Idea of an Idea is the generative notion behind the very notion of an invention and is causally necessary for all specific inventions."

What is postmodernism?

I put together this collection of excerpts from a most excellent book, ‘Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations’ by Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, as well as other sources, with the hopes that this little essay will remove some of the myths associated with postmodernism, and will show that it is not some sort of a bogeyman, but instead a large field of philosophy and cultural theory that has asked very important questions, pointed out very important problems and offered vital new perspectives, which continue to be relevant to this day, and which inform and influence our understanding of the world and its affairs – although it has also had its fair share excesses and absurdities.


I think we should get one thing out of the way before we continue: no, contrary to a popular myth sustained by many scientists and scientifically-minded people, postmodern theories do not usually concern themselves with natural sciences. Postmodernism is a social and cultural theory, dealing mostly with the arts, literature, politics, subjectivity, and so forth. There have been some unfortunate thinkers such as Baudrillard, who utterly failed to grasp the meaning of the scientific concepts they made use of, but such blunders are to be expected in such a vast and diverse field. But to think that postmodernism ‘misunderstands’ science is to engage in the fallacy of composition.


Postmodernism in a nutshell: Postmodernism attacks the notions of monolithic universals, totalizing ideas and foundational claims characteristic of modern thinking and instead encourages diversity, plurality, fluidity and multiple perspectives. It is anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist and has learned the criticisms of realist representational schemas*. Jean-Francois Lyotard defines postmodernism as an “incredulity toward metanarratives”, such as the unique status of the subject, the boundedness of information, and the march of progress (among other things), that had given order and meaning to Western thought during modernity, and which ignores the heterogeneity or plurality of human existence.


I’ll mostly avoid specific theoretical concerns, such as discourse theory, poststructuralist principles, and the like.

But let us first delineate the discourse of the modern, to see its differences from the postmodern.


Simply put – postmodernity is the historical period that follows modernity, just as the Renaissance was followed by modernity, as marked by specific cultural and social changes that alter the shape of human society to a greater or lesser extent. The postmodern period is said to be characterized by the commoditization of knowledge, globalization, and transnational consumerism, which replaced borders with networks, and the sale of goods with the sale of images.


Modernist thinkers describe modernism as such: it is characterized by innovation, novelty and dynamism; modernist thinkers championed reason as the source of progress in knowledge and society, as well as the privileged locus of truth and the foundation of systematic knowledge. Reason was deemed competent to discover adequate theoretical and practical norms upon which systems of thought and action could be built and society could be restructured.


Modernity entered everyday life through the dissemination of modern art, the products of consumer society, new technologies, and new modes of transportation and communication. “Modernization” came to denote those processes of individualization, secularization, industrialization, cultural differentiation, and rationalization which together have constituted the modern world.


Yet the construction of modernity produced untold suffering and misery for its victims, ranging from peasantry, proletariat, and artisans oppressed by capitalist industrialization to the exclusion of women from the public sphere, to the genocide of imperialist colonization. Modernity also produced a set of disciplinary institutions, practices, and discourses which legitimate its modes of domination and control.


Now postmodern theorists claim that the contemporary high-tech media society is producing a new form of existence, a novel sociocultural formation which requires new concepts and theories. Some theorists interpret these developments in terms of novel types of information, knowledge and technology, and others in terms of development of a higher stage of capitalism marked by a greater degree of capital penetration and homogenization across the globe.


Now, on to postmodern philosophy. In postmodern philosophy, modern theory is criticized for its search for a foundation of knowledge, for its universalizing and totalizing claims, for its hubris to supply apodictic truth.


Postmodern theory provides a critique of representation and the modern belief that theory mirrors reality, taking instead ‘perspectivist’ position that theories at best provide partial perspectives on their objects, and that all cognitive representations of the world are historically and linguistically mediated. Some postmodern theory accordingly rejects the totalizing macroperspectives on society and history favored by modern theory.


Postmodern theory also rejects modern assumptions of social coherence and notions of causality in favor of multiplicity, plurality, fragmentation, and indeterminacy. In addition, postmodern theory abandons the rational and unified subject postulated by much modern theory in favor of a socially and linguistically decentered and fragmented subject.


In politics, modernity is characterized by party, parliamentary, or trade union politics, in opposition to postmodern politics associated with locally based micropolitics that challenge a broad array of discourses and institutionalized forms of power.


Postmodern discourse in the aesthetic field celebrates the emergence of a ‘new sensibility’ in culture and the arts which challenges the rationalist need for content, meaning, and order. The new sensibility, by contrast, immerses itself in the pleasures of form and style, privileging and ‘erotics’ of art over a hermeneutics of meaning. Consequently, the new sensibility was more pluralistic and less serious and moralistic than modernism. Postmodern art is also characterized by the breakdown of the high-low distinction and the appearance of pop art and mass cultural forms, as well as a ‘closing of the gap’ between artist and audience. The new tradition rejected traditional values of Protestantism, Victorianism, rationalism and humanism. Postmodernism calls for a new criticism that abandons formalism, realism, and highbrow pretentiousness, in favor of the subjective response of the reader within a psychological, social, and historical context.


Against modernist values of seriousness, purity, and individuality, postmodern art exhibits a new insouciance, a new playfulness, and a new eclecticism.


Some depressed conservatives characterized the new emerging postmodern culture thus: they [postmodernists] reject and destroy the foundational assumptions and values of Western society, which include the loss of geographical and social unity, where the Western world could claim moral superiority and rights over ‘uncivilized’ peoples; and incredulous attitude toward progress as the trajectory and goal of history; the decline of utopian values; and skepticism toward the modernist belief in a direct correlation between liberal-humanist principles and moral conduct, a position made questionable in the 20th century by the savagery of world wars and the harmonious coexistence of high culture and concentration camps. Thus the postmodernists no longer blindly and unproblematically trust in science, art and reason as beneficent, harmonizing forces.


In a more theoretical vein, postmodernism draws from poststructuralist thought. In traditional theories of meaning, signifiers come to rest in the signified of a conscious mind. For postmodern theorists, the signified is only a moment in a never-ending process of signification, where meaning is produced not in a stable, referential relation between subject and object, but within the infinite, intertextual play of signifiers.


These new theories of language and discourse led to critiques of modern philosophy, attacking its root assumptions. It was claimed that modern philosophy was undermined by its impossible dream of attaining a foundation of knowledge, and absolute bedrock of truth that could serve as the guarantee of philosophical systems. This foundationalist assumption has been called a ‘metaphysics of presence’ that supposedly guarantees the subject an unmediated access to reality. The binary oppositions governing Western philosophy and culture (subject/object, appearance/reality, speech/writing, truth/falsity, happiness/unhappiness, and so on) work to construct a far-from-innocent hierarchy of values which attempt not only to guarantee truth, but also serve to exclude and devalue allegedly inferior terms and positions. The binary metaphysics thus works to positively position reality over appearance, speech over writing, men over women, or reason over nature, thus positioning negatively the supposedly inferior term.

In conclusion: postmodern theory stresses the importance of differences over unities and identities while championing the dissemination of meaning in opposition to its closure in totalizing, centered theories and systems, and can be characterized by a skepticism toward the simple binary oppositions predominant in Western metaphysics and humanism.


* - The idea that there is a strict differentiation between the “inside” of human mind and the “outside” of reality, and that humans have a direct, unmediated access to this outside reality. Also known as the correspondence theory of truth or the “mirror of nature” idea.

A shot at the Mary argument

Here's my shot at the old and famous Mary the Color Researcher argument, originally presented by Frank Jackson in 1982, which has since become part and parcel of analytic philosophy of mind. Most thinkers seem to reject the argument's conclusions, and Jackson himself no longer thinks his argument attained its goal (that physicalism is false). Still, as an excercise in philosophical thinking, it's quite useful. I'm sure my reply is nothing new, nevertheless, since I found the Mary argument to be utterly unconvincing, I'll present an objection that immediately came to my mind.


Here's the original thought experiment against physicality.

Mary spends her life in a black-and-white room and has no color sensations. She watches science lectures on black-and-white television and learns everything about seeing in color that can in that way be learned. This includes mastering the completed science of human color vision. If physicalism were true, she would know all the facts about color experiences, because physicalism entails that all such facts can be expressed in the colorless language of science. But, one thinks intuitively, when she ventures into the colorful outside world and has color experiences for the first time, she learns something: she learns what it's like to see in color. Therefore, Jackson concludes, physicalism is false.


So what's wrong with it? The argument is based on a rather funny understanding about what "information" or "facts" are. It supposes that readily available raw facts about the real physical condition of the outside world is what gives us information, and it is curioulsy expected that facts - information - can substitute or replace the actual physical experience. It is assumed that the world consists of information readily available to the senses, waiting to be "learned". This is incorrect, and there's a simple reason why. Information is not even supposed to substitute physical experience. One would think this is obviously impossible. Information is encoding, it's a presentation of beliefs or facts or thoughts in a specific medium, be it language, speech or any other notational system. Information is always encoded into a specific medium that is clearly and inevitably distinct from what the information itself is about.

If I had the complete physical information about, say, an earthquake, am I now supposed to assume that because my knowledge about the subject is exhaustibly complete, this information must turn into, cause, or in fact, be an earthquake? This is plainly ridiculous. To assume that all knowledge about something is that something is false, even absurd: a complete knowledge about earthquakes is not itself an earthquake.

It seems to me that the background for this line of thinking is the objectivist account of the world, that true facts about the world are just waiting to be perceived, that in fact the world consists of information and facts. This is, in my mind, wrong. First comes the physical experience, of living in the world. From that experience, information - knowledge - is gleaned, abstracted. When Mary leaves the room, she physically experiences color for the first time. There is nothing non-physical about this. It's a real world physical experience, which abstracted, second order information cannot substitute. Knowledge does not equal the world. Knowledge is only about the world.